Daniel Stanton · uOttawa PDI News · Posted: May 30, 2024 2:10 PM EST | Last Updated: 10 minutes ago
When we think of espionage, some clear mental images come to mind. Most of us immediately, without even thinking about it, picture back-alley deals, men in trench coats and fedoras, the stealing of secrets, especially military ones. Most of all, we picture spies, well, spying.
For much of the Cold War, this was the way things operated. It was your traditional spy craft and espionage. But the Soviet Union fell at the end of 1991. While this didn’t mark an end to global conflict or tension, the reality is that the world has changed dramatically since then, spy craft included.
But our mentality in the West, and particularly in Canada, is still suck in this Cold War mentality. And, unfortunately, it’s out of date.
From External Threats to Internal Opportunities
One thing that’s happened is that the dynamic of how secrets end up in the wrong hands has changed.
Once upon a time, spies were the mainstay of stealing secrets. Foreign intelligence services would invest significant time and resources in getting spies into government agencies, or convincing people already within them to commit treason, to gather intelligence and classified material. The Soviet effort to steal the designs for nuclear weapons from the Manhattan Project is a classic example.
But today, it’s far more often that secrets are making their way out rather than foreign actors coming in to take them. Often, it’s people within who are going looking for opportunities rather than being sought out. Take, for example, the case of Cameron Ortis, who was recently convicted of leaking information to organized crime, or Jeffrey Delisle, who walked into a Russian embassy and provided classified information for five years.
From Bombs and Military Plans to Research and Industrial Information
Another crucial aspect of the changing national security landscape is which information is being targeted. Again, when we think of spies stealing information, our thoughts tend to turn to highly classified documents and secrets, particularly military ones. Whether it’s a new type of stealth jet or nuclear codes, our focus is usually on a small number of very valuable, and very well-protected, secrets.
This is also outdated thinking. Not only are secrets being leaked from within, rather than being stolen, but the type of information that is sought after has changed dramatically. The target of foreign intelligence gathering today is much more focused on research data, financial information, and industrial secrets.
This is being driven by many things, particularly the growing prominence of China. In its bid to become the dominant superpower, it’s more concerned with economic competition and advantage against its adversaries, particularly the United States, than trying to find a military advantage.
From Spies and Generals to Scientists and General Electric
Of course, while governments have quite a bit of information of interest to other states, most of the information that countries like China are looking for isn’t tucked away in a dossier somewhere. It’s in laboratories, factories, and offices.
As such, much of mainstream espionage no longer even involves spies or the intelligence community. Secrets are not being leaked by spies, but by scientists and industry professionals. Consider the case of the scientists in Winnipeg who passed research and samples to China. CSIS didn’t originally flag them as a security risk because of ties to government or intelligence agencies but because of a disregard for rules governing basic procedures.
The effect of this has been to greatly shift the frontlines of national security. You’re not going to see spies checking on their hidden corkboard in the basement, covered in photos and twine and scattered notes. Rather, we’re seeing more and more ordinary people, civilians, working in a huge variety of industries, sharing what they don’t even always realize is sensitive information.
After all, for research especially, it’s not always clear what could be a politically relevant piece of information. A given piece of research in anything from biology or virology to physics or chemistry could have geopolitical significance that the researchers involved are totally unaware of.
We’re Focusing Efforts in the Wrong Places
The consequence of this is that a lot of effort being expended in the national security area is, frankly, wasted.
To be clear, conventional spying still exists and is still happening. Russia in particular puts significant effort into putting spies into deep cover so they can get close to people who can potentially give them access to sensitive information.
And there’s still plenty of secret-stealing happening, though a lot of that work has shifted to cybercrime. It’s generally easier to hack a computer than it is to hack a person.
But most of the time, we’re building fences and putting up barbed wire to keep the enemy out, while someone we’re working beside is walking out with the secrets. And much of Canada’s cybersecurity and national security legislation is focused on enforcement related to foreign spies stealing secrets, not people born and raised here who are leaking information. So, our legislative efforts especially need to change.
Conspiracy Theories Are Looking in the Wrong Places
National security, more than many fields, is prone to attracting conspiracy theories. It’s arguably the conspiracy industry, after all.
But by and large, these theories are looking in the wrong places. For example, despite secrets being leaked, you don’t often hear about people being charged under the Security of Information Act for spying. That’s because our laws aren’t designed around the avenues these secrets are taking.
The consequences of our misplaced attention are wide-ranging. There have been Chinese students wanting to come and study here that have been denied visas because they’re two or three steps removed from the Chinese Communist Party or the People’s Liberation Army. These people had no access, no real connection with espionage agencies, but were denied visas because they “could commit espionage.”
This sort of paranoia makes us think that we’re safe and we’re doing the right things, but all we’re doing is hurting and deceiving ourselves. That, in the long run, is bad for our national security.
Understanding Must Come First
The effect of our misunderstandings, conspiracy theories, and outdated legislations is that the efforts we do put towards securing our national security are, often as not, going to waste. We’re looking for the wrong things in the wrong places, locking the wrong doors, talking to the wrong people.
Now more than ever, in a globalized world, national security is a broad, dynamic, and complex field. It intersects with more private and semi-private organizations, from private companies to think-tanks and universities, than it ever has. Understanding the nuances involved in this changing landscape, where we need to be looking, who we need to be talking to, and how modern espionage works is crucial to securing everything from industrial secrets to sensitive research.
And understanding the situation is relevant not just to the James Bonds of the world but project leaders, managers, and many other industry professionals across the entire economy.
This is why the National Security program at the University of Ottawa Professional Development Institute covers everything from the psychological pathways to betrayal and insider threats, to the implications of China’s global rise and how national security intersects with open-source software development.